ASCII Art and Visual Jailbreaks
Jiang, Xu, Niu, Xiang, Ramasubramanian, Li, Poovendran, "ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs" (ACL 2024, arXiv:2402.11753). Mask the safety-relevant tokens in a harmful request, replace them with ASCII-art renderings of the same letters, and send the cloaked prompt. GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, Llama-2 all fail to robustly recognize ASCII-art tokens. The attack bypasses PPL (perplexity filters), Paraphrase defenses, and Retokenization. Related: the ViTC benchmark measures recognition of non-semantic visual prompts; StructuralSleight generalizes to Uncommon Text-Encoded Structures (trees, graphs, nested JSON) as a family of encoding attacks.
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